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When Mommy or Daddy is Gay:
Developing Constitutional Standards
for Custody Decisions
by Paula A. Brantner"

What standard should a court use in making child custody decisions
when one parent is gay, lesbian, or bisexual?
In this article the author examines the standards currently used by
state courts in awarding child custody. She then analyzes the different
ways in which a court factors in a parent's same-sex orientation in
applying these different standards. Her examination of the bases for
these decisions reveals that lower courts often rely on outdated information or negative stereotypes about homosexuality. The author then
considers how the application of these standards may violate the constitutional rights of gay, lesbian, or bisexual parents. Finally, the author
proposes the development and application of a federal direct adverse
impact standard for custody decisions that would protect the best interest of the child as well as the rights of the gay, lesbian, or bisexual
parent.

INTRODUCTION
Divorce can be one of the most traumatic and stressful experiences a
person will undergo in his or her lifetime. When the trauma of divorce is
intensified by a battle over custody of one's children, the process becomes even more difficult. When someone involved in that process is at
the same time dealing with issues of same-sex orientation, perhaps for the
ftrst time, it is easy to see why gay, lesbian, or bisexual individuals involved in a dissolution of marriage may experience extreme pressure,
since the issue of their sexual orientation could become a critical issue in
the court proceedings. When gay and lesbian parents are forced to make

* B.A. Michigan State University, 1989; University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, Class of 1992. This Article was initially prepared for a seminar
entitled "The Constitution and the Family," taught by Visiting Professor Leonard
Strickman. The author would like to thank Andrea .Palash for reviewing drafts of this
Article, and for providing guidance and wisdom.
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the choice between their children and their partners, or when courts make
that choice for them by imposing draconian restrictions based on myths
about how homosexuality impacts child-rearing, the impact of divorce is
particularly heartbreaking.
This Article will argue that universal constitutional standards regarding child custody cases and the gay parent are needed to ensure that homophobic biases do not prevent the best interests of the child from being
fairly considered and to ensure that gay parents are not unfairly denied
custody of their children. Parts I through III will examine the standards
currently utilized in custody decisions involving gay and lesbian parents
and will categorize custody decisions based upon the weight the court
places on the parent's same-sex orientation. Part IV will demonstrate how
current standards often rely upon scientifically unsupported and/or illogical stereotypes about homosexuality. Finally, Part V will question the
constitutionality of these standards. Furthermore, this part will advocate
the use of standards that do not rely upon bias but rather consider homosexuality to the same extent as any other factor already considered by the
courts. The paper will conclude that these revised standards are warranted
not only for their superior constitutional value, but also for their more
equitable results where gay, lesbian, and bisexual parents are concerned.

I.

GAY, LESBIAN, AND BISEXUAL PARENTS·

Approximately three to five million lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals
in this country are parents, and approximately eight to ten million children are currently being raised in gay households. 2 Currently, the majority of parents who are gay and lesbian had children while involved in a
marital or non-marital heterosexual relationship. 3 This relationship may
have existed before the parent was cognizant of her or his same-sex orientation, or before he or she acknowledged it to others. This Article will
focus on custody disputes involving children from previous heterosexual
marriages. Breakups of same-sex relationships also give rise to custody
battles, and cases involving biological and non-biological parents are
increasingly litigated. 4

1. This Article uses the tenns "gay" and "gay, lesbian, and bisexual" interchangeably to refer to persons with a same-sex orientation. The tenns "nongay," "straight,"
and "heterosexual" are also used to refer to the parent who is not oriented towards
someone of the same sex. The use of the tenn "homosexual" is avoided, as some
(including the author) feel the word has negative, clinical, and sex-focused connotations.
2. ROBERTA ACHTENBERG, LESBIAN AND GAY PARENTING: A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE at 1 (National Center for Lesbian Rights, 1987).
3. [d.
4. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); Nancy S. v.
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Custooy battles involving gay, lesbian, and bisexual parents are probably the most frequently litigated of lesbian/gay rights issues, yet most
cases remain relatively invisible. 5 Custody cases often do not go further
than the trial court level, and therefore are mostly unreported. 6 Parties
may choose not to appeal cases favorable to the gay, lesbian, or bisexual
parent, since these cases are more likely to have been decided on grounds
related to parenting, and not on bias or other grounds warranting appeal. 7
Those cases which are appealed often result in decisions unfavorable to
the gay parent, creating a negative body of precedent that makes others
less likely to challenge the disposition of their own cases. 8 In addition,
for a custody case to be overturned on appeal, the appellant must demonstrate that the trial court not only made an incorrect decision, but abused
its discretion by doing so, which is a difficult standard to meet. 9 Finally,
appellate litigation is time-consuming and expensive. Parents may not
have the fmancial resources to challenge adverse results, especially at a
time when their emotional resources are drained as well. 10

n. CURRENT STANDARDS FOR CUSTODY DECISIONS
A.

BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD

The standard which is almost universally applied by courts faced with
child custody decisions is the "best interests of the child" standard. 11
While the standard itself is vague, it has generally been interpreted to

Michele G., 228 Cal. App. 3d 831 (1991); See also Nancy Polikoff, This Child Does
Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian
Mother and Other Non-Traditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 3458 (1990).
5. Rhonda R. Rivera, Recent Developments in Sexual Preference Law, 30 DRAKE
L. REv. 311, 327 (1980-81).
6. [d.
7. Out of thirty-two reported custody cases surveyed, only twelve were initially
favorable to the gay parent. Of those, four were overturned on appeal due to the
insufficient weight given the parent's sexual orientation. Of the twenty cases initially
won by nongay parents, only three were overturned in favor of the gay parent. NATIONAL CENTER FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, LIST OF REPORTED CASES BY STATE (1988)
[hereinafter NCLR LIST].
8. Gay parents lost at both trial and appellate levels in seventeen of the thirty-two
cases reported, with an additional four cases lost at the appellate level. NCLR LIST,
supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., D.H. v. J.H., 418 N.B. 2d 286, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981) (illustrating
the difficulty of meeting the abuse of discretion standard). Only three of twenty
custody cases initially unfavorable to the gay parent have been overturned upon
appeal. NCLR LIST, supra note 7.
10. Donna Hitchens, Social Attitudes, Legal Standards & Personal Trauma in Child
Custody Cases, 5 J. OF HOMOSEXUALITY 89, 94 (1979-80).
11. Jeff Atkinson, Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 PAM. L.Q. 1, 4 (1984).
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mean that if a conflict exists between the rights of the parents and the
court's perception of the child's best interests, the conflict must be resolved in favor of the child's interests. 12 This doctrine has gradually replaced the traditional "tender years" custody standard, whi~h presUlned
that custody by the mother was always in the best interest of young children, if not all children. 13
When making the "best interests" determination, courts usually rely
on considerations such as: (1) which parent the child has lived with since
the parents' separation; (2) the fmancial resources of each parent; (3) the
home environment each parent will provide; and (4) whether one parent
is better able to provide for any special needs the child may have. 14 In
order to make the custody decision they feel will be best for the child,
courts have a great deal of discretion to weigh these factors and any others they deem relevant. These additional considerations often will include
the past and present sexual activity of both parents. If one parent is gay,
lesbian, or bisexual, sexual activity almost certainly will be considered. IS
B.

CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES

Courts employ a different standard when parents return to court to
ask for modification of the original custody order. In addition to the best
interests determination, a parent seeking modification must demonstrate to
the court that there has been a change in circumstances substantial
enough to warrant modification. 16 States vary regarding what types of
changes affect the child to the extent that modification is necessary, but
since the purpose of a higher standard of proof is to prevent frequent
shifts in custody between parents, the change in circumstances usually
must involve the child or custodial parent, and not merely the noncustodial parent. 17 For example, a change in the financial situation of the noncustodial parent which raises her or his income higher than the other
parent would not be sufficient to warrant uprooting the child, because
then the child could go back and forth between parents each time one
parent received a raise. However, if the custodial parent became seriously
ill, or remarried and moved to a new home, the noncustodial parent
would generally be entitled to have the custody decision reevaluated.

12. Steve Susoeff, Note, Assessing Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay
or Lesbian: Toward a Rational Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REv. 852, 853-54
(1985).
13. Atkinson, supra note 11, at 12.
14. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 92.
15. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94; NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 1-9 (Roberta Achtenberg & Mary Newcombe eds., 3rd prtg.
1990) [hereinafter NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD].
16. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-11.
17. Atkinson, supra note 11, at 5.

~
j";''''',-,'
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The above standards negatively affect gay and lesbian parents more
than heterosexual parents. Since homosexuality has been a key factor in
many decisions favoring the nongay parent, it is generally raised and
considered whenever a gay parent is a party. 18 The rights of gay people
become secondary to the consideration of the child's welfare when the
court believes that a parent's same-sex orientation can never be in the
best interests of the child. The court presumes the child will be adversely
affected, regardless of individual circumstances. If a gay parent obtains
custody initially without revealing her or his same-sex orientation to the
court, either deliberately or because the parent was unaware of her or his
orientation, the nongay parent is very likely to reopen custody proceedings once the same-sex orientation of the custodial parent is revealed.
Courts often consider the revelation of homosexuality to constitute a
change of sufficient weight to warrant custody modification. 19

m. CATEGORIES OF CUSTODY DECISIONS
In each custody decision in which a parent's same-sex sexual activity
is a factor, consideration of that activity may be categorized by one of
three standards: (1) conclusive disqualification standard: a parent's homosexuality is automatically presumed to make her or him an unfit parent;
(2) presumptive unfitness standard: there is a rebuttable presumption of
unfitness, which may be overcome if the parent conforms to behavioral
guidelines designed to minimize what is perceived as the "negative impact" of parental homosexuality; or (3) direct adverse impact standard/nexus test: parental homosexuality will not be considered a significant factor, unless there is a rmding of present adverse impact on the
child. 20
A.

CONCLUSIVE DISQUALIFICATION STANDARD

While the facts may differ from case to case, whenever the court
employs a conclusive disqualification standard the results are always the
same: if the court is aware that one parent is gay or lesbian, that parent
will not receive custody. 21 A parent's same-sex orientation alone mandates the conclusion that he or she is an unfit parent, regardless of the
parent's relationship status, whether the parent is openly gay in the con-

18. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-11.
19. Id. at 1-11; see also EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw 124 (1990) [hereinafter HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORS].

20. Nora Lauennan, Nonmarital Sexual Conduct and Child Custody, 46 U. CIN. L.
REv. 647, 654 (1977); see also Robert A. Beargie, Custody Determinations Involving
the Homosexual Parent, 22 PAM. L.Q. 71, 74-77 (1988).

21. This approach is also called the "per se" test by some commentators. See
Beargie, supra note 20, at 74.
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text of the family, or whether any impact on the child whatsoever is demonstrated. Courts are free in most states to ignore contrary expert testimony by merely stating that the decision was made in the best interests of
the child, and can disregard any testimony of family, friends, or social
workers that demonstrates not only that lesbians and gay men can be
capable parents, but that the gay parent seeking custody would be the
best custodial parent. 22
Roe v. Roe23 and G.A. v. D.A.24 are typical examples of cases that
employ the conclusive disqualification standard. In Roe, the father received custody following the mother's bout with cancer. During this time
the mother was physically unable to care for her daughter, and so relinquished custody to the father in a consent decree. Nearly four years after
the father gained custody, the mother became aware of her ex-husband's
gay relationship with the man who shared the house with her daughter
and ex-husband. She challenged the award of custody, and the trial court
modified the decree to grant the parents joint custody. The modification
was conditional upon the father not sharing a bed with his partner while
the child was present in the home. The trial court found the child to be
"a very happy child (who) seemed to be well adjusted and outgoing" and
found no evidence showing that her father's homosexuality had any adverse effect. 2s This factor, however, was not taken into consideration by
the appellate court, which granted sole custody to the mother. The court
rationalized that "the father's continuous exposure of the child to his
immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law .... The father's unfitness is manifested by his
willingness to impose this burden upon (his daughter) in exchange for his
own gratification. ,,26
In G.A. v. D.A., a Missouri case, a lesbian mother appealed the initial
grant of custody of her son to his father. The appellate court denied the
challenge, holding that "a court cannot ignore the effect which the sexual
conduct of a parent may have on a child's moral development. ,,27 This
decision was based on the fact that the lesbian mother lived with her
partner and occasionally hugged her in front of the son. 28 There was a

22. See, e.g., L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d 240, 243-45 (Mo. ct. App. 1982) (trial court
found that expert evidence, including articles from various journals, portions of books,
and statistical studies dealing with homosexuality was not credible. "[The facts of this
case] strip the scientific literature of its facade of statistics and in its application to
this case reduce it to nonsense.").
23. Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
24. G.A. v. D.A., 745 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Mo. ct. App. 1987).
25. Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 691-92.
26. Id at 694.
27. G.A., 745 S.W.2d at 728.
28. Id It is likely, however, that even if she lived separately from her partner and
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thoughtful dissent by Judge Lowenstein, who observed that, "[w]ith all
the evidence here pointing to the best interests of the child being served
in the mother's custody, her homosexual conduct should not automatically
call for another result.,,29 A later case, S.LH. v. D.B.H., fmnly established Missouri's conclusive disqualification standard, stating that "placing primary custody of a minor child with the nonhomosexual parent is
in the best interests of the child.,,30
In cases employing the conclusive disqualification standard, all other
factors affecting the child's best interests tend to be ignored once the
issue of a parent's homosexuality is raised. If factors such as fmancial
situation or home environment are considered at all, their value is minimized to a considerably greater extent than if homosexuality were not an
issue. For example, in G.A., the child had his own bedroom while living
with his mother, while his father slept in a one-room cabin and provided
only a cot for the child. 31 If the mother were not a lesbian, it seems certain that the living conditions provided by each parent would be significant. Since she was involved with someone of the same sex, however, the
court stated that "[the mother's] argument seems to be that this court
should overlook her sexual orientation and award custody solely on the
basis of which parent would provide the better house. ,,32
Another example of the conclusive disqualification standard is the
court's failure to consider the improved fmancial situation of a gay parent
who lives with a partner. Although gay parents living with partners may
be able to provide more fmancial resources for the child, they are generally less likely to be successful in a custody determination than a gay
parent who lives alone, or a nongay parent who does or does not live
alone. 33 Any fmancial benefits which might accrue are either not considered or are greatly outweighed by the perceived negative impact of the
child's exposure to the parent's partner. Courts look favorably, however,
at a nongay parent who remarries or enters into a relationship that improves the parent's fmancial situation. 34 Courts employing the conclusive
disqualification standard appear so obsessed with homosexuality that all
other factors become virtually irrelevant, and thus do not warrant mention

never demonstrated any affection toward her in her child's presence, she would still
not be able to retain custody if the conclusive disqualification standard was applied.
29. Id. at 730.
30. S.L.H. v. D.B.H., 745 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (mother was
permitted to retain custody only because the court did not believe allegations that she
was a lesbian).
31. G.A., 745 S.W.2d at 729.
32. Id. at 728.
33. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-19.
34. Donna 1. Hitchens, Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues, panel presentation at Lavender Law II (Oct. 6, 1990).
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in their view. 3S
B.

PRESUMPTIVE UNFITNESS/REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION STANDARD

This approach, sometimes described as a "middle ground" approach,36 presumes that a parent's homosexuality tends to negatively affect the child. 37 Unlike the conclusive presumption, however, under this
approach courts will allow the gay parent to overcome the negative presumption. Most courts will allow the presumption to be overcome only if
the parent agrees to minimize the child's exposure to homosexuality. On
the face of it, the courts applying this standard focus on the sexual activity involved in being homosexual, rather than the status of being gay,
lesbian, or bisexual. Thus, courts applying this standard will prohibit
same-sex activity and require the gay, lesbian, or bisexual parent to agree
to specific behavioral guidelines. The gay or lesbian parents who agree to
the restrictions are able to overcome the detrimental effect their sexual
orientation would have upon custody only by forgoing expression of their
sexuality. Often the gay parent may lose custody by failing to follow the
conditions imposed by the court. 38
Another use of the presumptive unfitness standard is to mask the
court's bias against granting custody to a gay or lesbian parent. These
courts claim that they are willing to award custody to a gay or lesbian
parent in appropriate cases, but in the particular case before them the
parent has failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that no negative effect would result from awarding custody.39 Significant in these decisions, however, is the absence of any clear assertion of what the appropriate case would be.
In both these applications of the presumptive unfitness standard,
courts have retained their biases against homosexuality but have been
influenced by society's willingness to accept homosexuality to the extent

35. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 92. Most of the reported cases deal exclusively
with the issue of sexual orientation. Occasionally, a court will claim that homosexuality is not solely the basis for the decision, but homosexuality, coupled with other
factors in the case, tips the scale in favor of the nongay parent. See, e.g., Bark v.
Bark, 479 So. 2d 42, 42-43 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985); Thigpen v. Carpenter, 730 S.W.2d
510, 513-14 (Ark. App. 1987).
36. See Beargie, supra note 20, at 75; L. Lee Dowding, Note, Immoral Because
They're Bad, Bad Because They're Wrong: Sexual Orientation and Presumptions of
Parental Unfitness in Custody Disputes, 26 CAL. WESTERN L. REv. 395, 409 (1990).
37. Lauerman, supra note 20, at 657.
38. The same denial or restrictions imposed in custody cases are even more commonly applied to visitation cases. Of twenty reported cases involving visitation rights
of a gay parent, fifteen placed some restriction on the parent's visitation (most commonly, no overnight visitation, or parent's partner not allowed to be present). NCLR
LIST, supra note 7.
39. See, e.g., Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 9-10 cPa. Super. o. 1985).
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that it is hidden and does not challenge dominant nonns.
Most presumptive unfitness cases purport to be based upon the sexual
behavior of the gay, lesbian, or bisexual parent. 40 Those who might fmd
distinctions based solely on the status of the parent's homosexuality unacceptable may readily accept distinctions based upon conduct. While courts
may attempt to distinguish between status and conduct in presumptive unfitness cases, they tend to disregard the distinction when issuing the custody decision.
If courts place restrictions regarding sexual activity on gay parents
that would not be imposed upon heterosexual parents, then courts are
actually basing the custody decision upon the parent's status as gay, lesbian, or bisexual, not the parent's conduct as a sexually active adult. The
court's statusfbehavior distinction becomes merely a pretext for a decision
based upon status. Heterosexual parents are not routinely asked to forgo
sexual relationships with other adults to obtain possible custody of their
children - lesbian and gay parents are. 41
Inappropriate sexual behavior around children by any parent should
be discouraged by the court to the extent that exposure to such behavior
is obviously not in the child's best interest. The problem lies, however,
with courts that consider any display of affection between adults of the
same sex, including hand-holding and hugging, to be overtly sexual and
inappropriate. 42 Meanwhile, the same behavior between heterosexual

40. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied 451 U.S.
911 (1981) (noting the potential hann to the child due to social stigma and isolation
resulting from mother's overt lesbianism); L. v. D., 630 S.W.2d at 242-43.
41. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94. Compare N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d 179,
186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (same-sex relationship "voluntarily chosen") and L v. D.,
630 S.W.2d at 244 (parent "refused to give up [gay] lifestyle.") with Wilhelmsen v.
Peck, 743 S.W.2d 88, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (mother's extramarital heterosexual
cohabitation insufficient to warrant change of custody). Cj Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at
512 (court claims both heterosexual and homosexual "illicit" (non-marital) relationships
would be treated in same way). But see Ketron v. Aguirre, 692 S.W.2d 261 (Ark. Ct.
App. 1985) (custody granted to mother living with married man with order that living
arrangements be terminated). See also Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's
Journey Into Day, 8 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 219, 231 (1985) (in fourteen of sixteen
cases that lesbian mothers lost, the mother had a partner); Robert G. Bagnall et at.,
Note, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System: Homosexual Panic,
Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARv. C.R.C.L. L. REv. 497, 525 (1984).
42. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 65 (exchanging vows and rings); S.E.G. v.
R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (showing affection in front of
children and sleeping together in the family home); M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966,
967 (Okla. 1982) (had "wedding," held hands in child's presence); Roe, 324 S.E.2d at
693 ("flaunting" relationship by sharing bed in home) (see supra notes 23-26 and
accompanying text); In the Matter of the Marriage of Cabalquinto, 718 P.2d 7 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1986) (striking trial court's order that father limit association with partner
during visitation); J.L.P. (H.) v. D.J.P., 643 S.W.2d 865, 871-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(taking child to church where many members were gay and to activist social meet-

106

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3: 1

adults is not considered to negatively affect the child. Thus, even though
the court cites the "behavior" of the gay or lesbian parent as being the
deciding factor, because that behavior would not be a factor when a heterosexual parent is involved, the decision is actually based upon the sexual orientation of the parent. 43 In addition, since gay men and lesbians
are unable legally to marry their same-sex partners, courts that negatively
view any non-marital relationship, whether same-sex or opposite-sex,
impose an additional burden on gay parents, who are unable to legitimize
their relationships by marrying their partners. 44
Presumptive unfitness decisions generally involve restrictions on the
presence of a same-sex partner in the household, but may sometimes even
prohibit any exposure of the child to the parent's partner. The parent may
be prohibited from involvement in gay organizations or churches, or even
from associating with other gay persons while the child is present. A. v.
A. is a typical presumptive unfitness case. 45 The father in this case had
assumed custody upon the parents' divorce. The mother had not maintained any relationship with her children during the eleven years between
the divorce and the motion to modify. The father had admitted to "possible homosexual traits and tendencies" after the initial custody determination,46 yet he was permitted to retain custody because the evidence did
not show any exposure of the children to "deviant sexual acts," nor was
any adverse effect upon the children demonstrated. The court responded
to the motion to modify by ruling that the father was prohibited from
having a partner live in the family home, and that his custody would be
placed under the supervision of the juvenile authorities. 47
N.K..M. V L.E.M.48 is a presumptive unfitness case with more adverse
results for the gay parent than those in A. v. A. The lesbian mother was
initially granted custody, provided that her partner was never allowed in
the presence of her daughter. When the condition was violated, the father
sought and was granted custody. The court found that the daughter's best

ings).
43. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-19. See also Atkinson,
supra note 11, at 29 ("A [heterosexual] parent who has a relationship of which the
child might be aware, but refrains from engaging in sex when the child is home, will
also usually not lose custody.").
44. See, e.g., Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 512-14; Roe, 324 S.E.2d at 694 (supra notes
23-28 and accompanying text).
45. A. v. A., 514 P.2d 358 (Or. App. 1973).
46. Id at 359.
47. Id at 360-61.
48. N.K.M., 606 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). While this case uses presumptive unfitness language, the result would have been the same had the court
employed the conclusive disqualification standard used in later Missouri cases. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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interests were not served by any association with her mother's partner. To
ensure further contact did not occur, the father was awarded custody."9
The court did not acknowledge that nongay parents are not routinely
expected to prevent their partners from becoming part of the family.~
Thus, gay parents are forced to make impossible and intolerable decisions. Parents who fail to comply with the court's restrictions may lose
their children. If they do comply, they may lose their partners or the
ability to be openly gay and to maintain contact with other gay persons,
which takes its own psychological toll. 51 Nancy Polikoff, a frequent
commentator on gay and lesbian custody issues, states that, "the more we
[lesbians, gay men and bisexuals] appear to be part of the mainstream,
with middle-class values, middle-of-the-road political beliefs, repressed
sexuality, and sex-role stereotyped behavior, the more likely we are to
keep custody of our children. ,,52 Even those who do not subscribe to
these values but are willing to put forth this appearance in order to maintain custody may fmd that courts are extremely predisposed against
them. 53
C.

DIRECI' ADVERSE IMPACI' STANDARD

The direct adverse impact standard, also called the nexus test, requires a court to fmd that the parent's homosexuality adversely affects the
child before custody will be denied. 54 Under this test, the gay or lesbian
parent begins on a more equal footing with the nongay parent. Instead of
having to prove that homosexuality does not and will not affect the child,
the burden of proof is shifted to the nongay parent, who must conclusively demonstrate that the other parent's homosexuality is presently affecting
the child in a negative way. Courts employing this standard have recognized that it is no more valid to presume a gay parent is automatically an
unfit parent than it was to presume that the female parent was automatically the most fit parent, as was held under the "tender years" approach

49. N.K.M., 606 S.W.2d at 183.
50. Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94.
51. See NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15.
52. Nancy Polikoff, Lesbian Mothers, Lesbian Families: Legal Obstacles, Legal
Challenges, 14 N.Y.V. REv. L. & Soc. ClI. 907 (1986).
53. See, e.g., Anagnostopoulos v. Anagnostopoulos, 317 N.E.2d 681, 683 (TIL Ct.
App. 1974) (mother who drove a motorcycle, was not religious, had gay friends, was
possibly gay herself, and wanted a career was not entitled to custody. The court expressed its disdain for the mother as "one of the members of the current avantgarde.").
54. Lauerman, supra note 20, at 658; Beargie, supra note 20, at 76-78. The use of
this standard was advocated by Nan Hunter and Nancy Polikoff in Custody Rights of
Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and litigation Strategy, 25 BUFFALO L. REv. 691,
714-15 (1976).
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formerly employed by courts."
Doe v. Doe employs this adverse impact standard. 56 In Doe, the parents had joint legal custody, with physical custody primarily exercised by
the father. When a conflict arose between the two parents, the father
petitioned for sole legal and physical custody, based on his ex-wife's
relationship with the woman who shared her home. The court here presumed that the mother's lesbian relationship alone was not a valid reason
to preclude her from retaining joint custody. After considering testimony
by psychiatrists, the court concluded that "[t]here is no evidence to show
that the wife's lifestyle will adversely affect [the child]."" Since there
was no showing of direct adverse impact upon the child, homosexuality
was not a factor in the custody decision.
In re Marriage of Birdsall also demonstrates the courts' use of the
nexus teSt.'8 Mr. Birdsall, a gay parent, was not allowed to have any
third party known to be gay present during his child's visitation. The
court vacated the order containing the restriction, holding that "[n]o current harm to the child can be attributed to [the father's] sexual orientation. And there is no evidence of future detriment . . . . Evidence of one
parent's homosexuality without a link to detriment to the child, is insufficient to constitute harm. ,,'9 The court also strongly rejected unfounded
biases apparently relied upon by the lower court in making its decision.
The lower court had concluded that even the father considered his lifestyle harmful to his child, based on the fact that he had stated that he
would not raise his son to be gay. The lower court also concluded that
the child would be negatively impacted by the conflict between the
father's homosexuality and the mother's religious beliefs. 60 The appellate
court disagreed with the inference that the father believed his lifestyle
harmful, and found that the mother's religious condemnation was not an
adequate basis to deny custody. 61

IV. MYTHS ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY AFFECTING
CUSTODY DECISIONS
When courts use either the conclusive disqualification standard or the
rebuttable presumption standard instead of the direct adverse impact standard, the court's rationale for choosing the standard often includes the use

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293 (Mass. ct. App. 1983).

Id
In
Id.
Id
61. Id

at 296.
re Marriage of Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024 (1988).
at 1031.
at 1030.
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of one or more myths about the relationship between an individual's homosexuality and her or his fitness as a parent. Although these myths have
been empirically disproven, courts will often reject scientific research by
simply stating that homosexuality is bad and will be harmful to the
child,62 or by discounting expert testimony that does not support its result. 63 Continuing to educate the judiciary may help in this regard. However, Nancy Polikoff feels that educating the judiciary has accomplished
little, since even in recent cases where a great deal of expert testimony
and scientific data was presented to counter myths about homosexuality,
courts have still found reasons to doubt the credibility of this evidence. 64
The following are the most common myths surrounding homosexuality,
and thus the myths most often articulated in child custody cases.
A.

HOMOSEXUALITY AS MENTAL ILLNESS

Courts often view lesbian and gay parents as mentally unstable, and
thus unfit to care for their children. 65 However, researchers have concluded that there is no evidence that homosexuals as a group are more
neurotic, unhappy, or psychologically maladjusted than heterosexuals
living similar lives. 66 In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from its list of mental illnesses, stating that "homosexuality per se implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability
or general social or vocational abilities. ,,67 The American Psychological
Association has issued a policy statement which affmns that "sexual orientation of natural . . . parents should not be the sole or primary variable
considered in custody . '. . cases. ,,68 In short, there is no basis for the
conclusion that homosexuality equals instability. Therefore, courts should
rely upon individualized determinations of each parent's mental and emotional stability instead of automatically concluding that the gay, lesbian,
or bisexual parent is the least stable of the two parents contesting custo-

62. N.KM., 606 S.W.2d at 186.
63. See J.LP.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 868-69; see also supra note 22.
64. Nancy Polikoff, Contested Child Custody and Visitation Issues, panel presentation at Lavender Law IT, (Oct. 6, 1990).
65. See, e.g., Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (Mass. 1980) (rejects trial
court's conclusion that lesbian mother unstable); see also Thigpen, 730 S.W.2d at 512
(court relies on testimony regarding prior instability despite evidence of stability
during marriage).
66. ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, Homosexualities: A Study of Diversity

Among Men and Women (1978).
67. Susoeff, supra note 12, at 872 (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION,
D.S.M. ill: DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (3rd ed.
1980».

68. I.I. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, for the
year 1976: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of Representatives, 32
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST 432 (1977).
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dy.
B.

SEXUAL ORIENTATION OF CHILD

Another common myth about homosexuality is that children exposed
to homosexuality on an extensive basis will "become" gay themselves. 69
Underlying this belief is an assumption that heterosexuality is preferable
to homosexuality, and that it would be negative for children to emulate
their gay parents. This assumption is one that many people would dispute. 70 This myth is illogical since it fails to explain how so many children raised by heterosexual parents "acquired" their homosexuality, since
most gay individuals were raised in heterosexual households. 71
Scientific studies of children raised by gay parents have conclusively
shown that there is no higher prevalence of homosexuality in those families than in heterosexual families. One study comparing lesbian and single-parent households found "no differences in terms of gender identity,
sex role behavior, or sexual orientation.,,72 Another researcher who studied only households of gay and transsexual parents found that "all [the
children] have developed a typical sexual identity, including heterosexual
orientation. ,,73
Perhaps what courts actually fear is that when a child is raised in a
household where homosexuality is clearly acceptable, the child may grow
up more aware of his or her own sexual orientation. If the child is gay,
she or he may be less likely to fear the stigma of coming out than a
child raised in a heterosexual household, and thus may be more likely to
be openly gay at a young age. 74 However, those youths who are not
aware of or feel unable to reveal their sexual orientation are no less gay

69. See, e.g., S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d at 66 (appellate court accepted court-appointed
psychologist's testimony as to daughter in dispute "having difficulties in achieving a
fulfilling heterosexual identity of her own"); Conkel v. Conkel, 509 N.E. 2d 983, 986
(Ohio App. 1987) (rejects heterosexual mother's contention that child will become gay
through exposure to gay father); N.K.M. v. L.E.M., 606 S.W.2d at 186 ("who would
place a child in a milieu where she may be inclined toward [homosexuality]?").
70. M. Neil Browne & Andrea Giampetro, The Contribution of Social Science Data
to the Adjudication of Child Custody Disputes?, 15 CAP. U. L. REv. 43, 47 (1985);
HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORS, supra note 19, at 129.
71. ACHTENBERG, supra note 2, at 3.
72. Susan Golombok, Ann Spencer, & Michael Rutter, Children in Lesbian and
Single Parent Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 4 J. OF CIULD
PSYCHOL. AND PSYCHIATRY AND APPLIED DISCIPLINES 551, 571 (1983).
73. Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 692, 696 (1978).
74. This appears to be one of the concerns in M.J.P., 640 P.2d at 968 ("If homosexual behavior is legalized, and thus partly legitimized, an adolescent may question
whether he or she should 'choose' heterosexuality. At the time their sexual feelings
begin to develop, many young people have more interests in common with members
of their own sex.").
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than their openly gay counterparts.
Children raised in openly lesbian or gay households may learn to
accept and admire homosexuality, or any other form of diversity, without
necessarily being gay or lesbian themselves. Educating the courts is critical. Courts must be shown that sexual orientation is determined at an
early age,7S and that custody by gay parents will not affect the child's
sexual orientation, but in fact may serve to benefit the child by strengthening the child's acceptance of diversity in him or herself and in others. 76
C.

ABUSE OR MOLESTATION BY GAY PARENTS

Another myth damaging to favorable custody determinations involving gay parents is the belief that gay parents are more likely to abuse or
molest their children. Evidence does not support this myth. Research
shows that heterosexual males constitute the overwhelming majority of
those who sexually abuse children (generally their daughters), and that
women rarely molest children. 77 Courts still seem willing to accept the
myth, however, and either restrict custody or visitation rights on this
basis, or deny gay and lesbian parents custody altogether. 78 Occasionally, parents have even been denied the opportunity to interact with their
children without another adult present ostensibly to monitor their behavior. 79 The sensationalism of our nation's press when reporting incidences
of homosexual child molestation further perpetuates this myth; one is led
to believe that only gay people molest children even though, as indicated,
heterosexual father/daughter molestation is much more common.
D.

LIKELlliOOD OF CONTRACTING AIDS FROM GAY PARENT

Another myth is that AIDS can be transmitted through casual contact,
or the hugging and kissing present in parent/child interaction. It cannot. 80 Nevertheless, trial courts have requested gay parents to undergo

75. See infra p.38 and note 118.
76. Bagnall et al., supra note 41, at 534.
77. See, AMERICAN HUMANE ASSOCIATION, CHn.DREN'S DMSION, PROTECTING TIm
CHILo VICfIM OF SEX CRIMEs COMMITIED BY ADULTS 216-17 (Y. DeFrancis ed.,
1969), cited in ACHTENBERG, supra note 2, at 13 (97% of sex offenders against
children are male, and 90% of victims are female).
78. See, e.g., J.L.P.(H.), 643 S.W.2d at 867, 869 (court refused to believe testimony
that 95% of adult molestation is heterosexual, and instead asserts, "[e]very trial
judge . . . knows that the molestation of minor boys by adult males is not as uncommon as the psychological experts' testimony indicated.").
79. See, e.g., Roberts v. Roberts, 489 N.E. 2d 1067, 1070 (Ohio App. 1985) (remanded with recommendation that visitation by father take· place in presence of
mother, or other "sufficiently controlled" circumstances to shield the children from

their father's homosexuality). See also Hitchens, supra note 10, at 94.
80. Gerald H. Friedland, Brian R. Saltzman, Martha F. Rogers, et aI., Lack of
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HIV antibody testing or have restricted custody of a gay parent because
they fear that the child is at risk by living with a gay parent, even if that
parent is not mv positive. 81 Even though lesbians as a group are the
least at risk for contracting AIDS (less so even than heterosexual parents82), lesbians have also been affected by AIDS misinfonnation. 83
E.

STIGMA OR HARASSMENT OF CHILD

The fmal myth about child custody by gay parents is that the child
will be subject to stigma or harassment by her or his peers if the gay or
lesbian parent obtains custody. 84
This assumes a number of factors which mayor may not actually be
present in each child's particular situation; however, courts often proceed
as if the child is automatically subject to stigma both now and in the
future. This myth presumes that other children in the community are
aware of their playmate's parenting situation. Many children may be unaware, however, that a same-sex couple is raising their friend, or may not
understand that some attach a moral stigma to homosexuality. It also
presumes that if others are aware of the parenting situation, they will
stigmatize the child. In fact, they may not disapprove or care.
Another presumption is that stigma and harassment will be lessened if
the gay parent does not have custody. If the presumption is that stigma
will follow the child of the gay parent, the stigma would not be lessened
if the child does not live with that parent because the mere existence of a
gay parent could cause the child to be stigmatized. 8s Yet another presumption is that any stigma will be hannful to the child, and that such a
stigma will outweigh the benefits conferred by custody in the hands of
the parent otherwise best suited to custody. 86 Researchers have found

Transmission of HTLV-III/LAV Infection to Household Contacts of Patients with AIDS
or AIDS-Related Complex with Oral Candidiasis, 314 N. ENGLAND J. MEn 344 (No.
6, Feb. 6, 1986); Merle A. Sande, Transmission of AIDS, The Case Against Casual
Contagion, id. at 380.
81. Conkel, 509 N.E.2d at 987; Stewart v. Stewart, 521 N.E.2d 956, 963-66 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Roe, 526 N.Y.S.2d 718, 725 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
82. AClITENBERG, supra note 2, at 4 (citing telephone conversation with CDC official).
83. HARVARD LAW REVIEW EDITORS, supra note 19, at 127, n. 64.
84. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 314 N.W.2d 78, 81 (N.D. 1981); M.J.P. 640 P.2d at
969; contra M.P. v. S.P., 404 A.2d 1256 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (an excellent examination of the purported effects of stigma and harassment).
85. See M.P., 404 A.2d at 1262 (concludes that stigma would not be lessened if
the nongay parent had custody, since "children's exposure to embarrassment is not
dependent upon the identity of the parent with whom they happen to reside").
86. Id. ("Within the context of a loving and supportive relationship, there is no
reason to think that the girls will be unable to manage whatever anxieties may flow
from the community's disapproval of their mother.").
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that only about 5 percent of children who have lived with an openly gay
parent have been harassed by other children. 87 In addition, researchers
have found no connection between a parent's same-sex orientation, or any
resulting stigmatization, and the development of emotional problems in
children. 88

V. CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF
THE LESBIAN/GAY PARENT
The existence of a federal constitutional standard specifically governing lesbian and gay custody cases, or generally governing all custody
cases, would be invaluable. A constitutional standard based on equal
protection, privacy, or freedom of association grounds would provide a
guideline for courts that might otherwise resort to personal bias to reach a
decision, and would provide a strong basis for appeal when lower courts
ignore the standard and make biased decisions.
A cautionary note is in order, however. Child custody cases do not
often hinge upon constitutional issues, and those who represent gay and
lesbian parents should not neglect treatment of the gay parent's individual
parenting situation in order to focus upon constitutional issues. 89 Constitutional grounds are most effective when used to strengthen the gay
parent's case, but should not be the sole focus. If the court's decision is
to be based upon the superior ability to parent, the attorney will want to
ensure success on those grounds by making a strong argument on behalf
of the gay or lesbian parent. 90
The United States Supreme Court has yet to decide any case involving gay parents and child custody, so the merit of the following arguments have not been determined by our highest court. Therefore, courts
are free to accept or reject these arguments by distinguishing them from
cases already decided by the Supreme Court.
Attorneys furthering gay rights claims may be reluctant to approach
the· current Supreme Court after the adverse result in Bowers v.

87. Brian Miller, Gay Fathers and Their Children, 28 FAM. COORDINATOR 544, 548
(Oct. 1979). See also Green, supra note 73, at 695. Harry Zelinka, an evaluator and
mediator for the Office of Family Court Services in Santa Clara County, also asserts
that stigmatization is quite rare in the custody disputes with which he has been
personally involved. Presentation at BALIF Family Law Conference (November 17,
1990).
88. Martha Kirkpatrick and Donna Hitchens, Lesbian MotherS/Gay Fathers, in
EMEROINO ISSUES IN CHILD PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw (Elissa P. Benedek and
Diane H. Schetky eds., 1985).
89. Hunter and Polikoff, supra note 54, at 725.
90. ACHrENBERG, supra note 2, at 6 (application of a nexus standard would permit
a decision on the grounds of parenting ability).
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Hardwick,91 which contained inflammatory rhetoric against homosexual
sodomy. However, some lower federal courts have been willing to grant
gay men and lesbians constitutional rights. 92 Success may also be possible at the state court level,93 as custody decisions remain in state courts
unless appealed to the United States Supreme Court.
A.

EQUAL PROTECTION

1.

Constitutionality of Custody Decisions Based on Biases

The 1984 United States Supreme Court case of Palmore v. Sidoti94
may have particular relevance to the situation of gay parents seeking
custody. In Palmore, the mother lost custody of her daughter to her exhusband after she married an African-American. Chief Justice Burger, in
his Supreme Court opinion, cited heavily from the trial court's holding,
presumably to decry its egregiousness. The trial court claimed, "the
wife ... has chosen for herself and for her child, a life-style unacceptable to the father and to society," and that "[the mother's choice of a
black spouse] tended to place gratification of her own desires ahead of
her concern for the child's future welfare. ,,95 The basis for the trial
court's decision was that "it is inevitable that [the child] will ... suffer
from the social stigmatization that is sure to come.,,96 The language used
by the trial court here is likely to be found in almost every case that has
been decided adversely to a gay parent.
The Supreme Court strongly rejected the trial court's analysis. While
the Court recognized the risk that the child would be subject to "pressures and stresses not [otherwise] present,,,97 it held that "[t]he question,
however, is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury
they might inflict are permissible considerations for removal of an infant
child from the custody of its natural mother. We have little difficulty
concluding that they are not. ,,98 This was a unanimous decision, so there
can be no doubt that the Court strongly believes that "[p]rivate biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indi-

91. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
92. High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Security Clearance Ofc., 668 F. Supp. 1361
(N.D. Cal. 1987), rev'd in 895 F.2d 563 (9th Circ. 1990); Watkins v. United States
Anny, 847 F.2d 1329 (Wash. 1988), vacated and affirmed on other grounds, 875
F.2d 699, cert. denied 111 S. Ct. 384 (1990).
93. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (1985); Conkel, 509 N.E.2d 983;
M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1986).
94. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
95. Id. at 431.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 433.
98. Id
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recdy, give them effect.,,99
Palmore may be distinguished in that it involved a racial classification which the Court had already found required "most exacting
scrutiny."I00 Given the result in Bowers v. Hardwick/o l where the
Court failed to recognize how sodomy laws adversely impact gay men,
lesbians, and bisexuals, the Court seems less likely to determine that
sexual orientation discrimination warrants such a high level of scrutiny, if
it deserves heightened scrutiny at all. However, given the passion of the
language in Chief Justice Burger's opinion, and the unanimity of the
Court, it is certainly reasonable to assume that any biases that interfere
with a true determination of the child's best interests will be found unconstitutional. Palmore should preclude application of the conclusive
disqualification standard or the rebuttable presumption standard to the
extent that custody limitations are founded upon bias.
Some state courts have already deemed Palmore applicable to a custody decision involving a gay parent. 102 The Alaska Supreme Court, in
1985, cited Palmore when it ruled that, "it is impermissible to rely on
any real or imagined social stigma attaching to the mother's status as a
lesbian. ,,103 Perhaps it is not overly optimistic to believe that as more
research is conducted, and more education of society in general takes
place, courts will be able to recognize the irrationality of their personal
biases and attempt to exclude them from an evaluation of what is truly
best for the child.

2.

Constitutionality of Irrebuttable Presumptions

Courts that presume that no gay parent can be a fit parent by using
the conclusive disqualification standard employ an irrebuttable presumption that is constitutionally questionable in light of the United States Supreme Court decision of Stanley v. Illinois. 104 Mr. Stanley was denied
any rights to custody after his children's mother died because he had not
been married to her. The state of lllinois operated under the presumption
that unwed fathers were unfit, and thus no hearing to determine actual
fitness was necessary before the children were declared wards of the
state. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected this presumption, fIDding that the
state had denied Stanley due process of law by denying him a hearing.
The Court further found that by distinguishing between unwed fathers and
all other parents, the state had denied Stanley the equal protection of the

99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id. at 432.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186.
See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
103. S.N.E., 699 P.2d at 879.
104. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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laws guaranteed to him under the Fourteenth Amendment. lOS
The Court in Stanley detailed a line of cases that demonstrated that
parents clearly have an interest in raising their children. 106 Next, the
opinion cites past cases that have found blanket exclusions based on one
particular factor to be unconstitutional. A statute depriving military personnel of the right to vote in Texas was unconstitutional because "[i]t
viewed people one-dimensionally. .. when a fmer perception could
readily have been achieved by assessing a . . . claim . . . on an individualized basis. ,,107 The Court then declared, "when, as here, the procedure
forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important interests of both parent
and child."l08
Those who consider the precedent of Stanley inapplicable for gay
parents seeking custody seek to limit its applicability to situations in
which a hearing is not available or is specifically denied. Since gay parents have their day in court (albeit an often unpleasant and unsatisfactory
one), constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment would be satisfied. However, a hearing is useless to a gay parent if the court utilizes an
irrebuttable presumption, just as a hearing would have had little benefit
for Mr. Stanley if the policy was to deny unwed fathers custody.
Another possible means of distinguishing Stanley from gay parent
cases is that the irrebuttable presumption in Stanley was a state policy,
instead of legal precedent. However, although no custody statute contains
on its face the irrebuttable presumption that all gay parents are unfit, the
discretion provided by these statutes effectively permits the courts to
employ such a presumption. 109 In states that appear willing to deny all
gay parents custody, such as Missouri,110 there is little difference between a policy provided to adjudicators by the legislature and a body of
judicial precedent consistently relied upon to produce results adverse to
gay parents. The result is the same: the irrebuttable presumptions will
preclude custody. Indeed, one could argue that an irrebuttable presumption promulgated by a legislature, as in Stanley, is more deserving of
judicial deference than a presumption created by court cases. Thus, use of
an irrebuttable presumption, whatever its origins, violates procedural due
process, as well as equal protection principles. III

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id at 651.
Stanley, 405
Id.

u.s.

at 655, citing Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-65.
See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-64.
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Traditional Equal Protection Analysis

a.

Strict Scrutiny

117

When a court applies equal protection analysis, it must ftrst detennine
whether the government's action is "rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. ,,112 Since almost any actions taken by trial courts
in relation to custody matters would probably meet such a minimal standard, it is necessary to determine whether a higher standard should apply.
If a suspect class is involved, the action will be subject to strict scrutiny.1l3 While homosexuality has yet to be established as a suspect classification, sexual orientation shares many characteristics with other suspect classifications, such as race and national origin. If strict scrutiny is
applied, then the classification must serve a "compelling" governmental
goal. 114 The classification must also be "precisely tailored" to the governmental interest at issue. lIS
There are a number of factors that characterize a suspect classification. They include: (1) a history of discrimination; (2) discrimination
based upon inaccurate stereotypes; (3) traditional exclusion from the political process; and (4) immutability of the characteristic. 116 Sexual orientation qualifies as a suspect classification in all these regards.
To determine whether there has been a history of discrimination, the
courts "look to whether the class has faced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment. ",117 Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals qualify in this
regard. Laws, court decisions, and societal attitudes all either explicitly or
implicitly suggest that discrimination against gay men and lesbians is
permissible. Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals also suffer from inaccurate
stereotyping, as documented in Part IV.
While gay men and lesbians are beginning to have some influence on
the political process, as a group they have traditionally been excluded
from that process. Indeed, even nongay politicians who align themselves
with gay issues subject themselves to political liability. Finally, while
there is still some debate about the causers] of sexual orientation, it is
generally agreed that same-sex orientation is not changeable and is established at an early age; 118 thus, it is immutableY 9 If homosexuality is

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191 (1964).
Id.
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 432.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 (1981).
Harris M. Miller IT, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REv.
797, 811 (1984).
117. Id. at 814.
118. See Baker v. Wade, 553 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Tex. 1982). See generally MAR.-
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considered a suspect classification, then governmental action must serve a
compelling interest.
Custody decisions based upon the best interests of the child would
likely constitute a compelling interest. Decisions that focus on the evils of
homosexuality and fail to consider the best interests of the child should
not survive a strict scrutiny standard since their reliance on conjecture
and myth is inappropriate. 120 A blanket exclusion of all gay parents is
also not narrowly tailored, since it permits the opposing parent to have
custody regardless of whether that parent is fit or whether custody by that
parent is actually in the child's best interests. For example, a conclusive
disqualification standard excludes' gay parents who are not sexually active
and whose same-sex orientation is not known to the child, while allowing
nongay parents whose sexual activity is harmful to the child to obtain or
retain custody. Therefore, if sexual orientation is considered a suspect
classification, governmental policy precluding custody by gay parents
does not survive the strict scrutiny test.
It is difficult to persuade courts that sexual orientation should be a
suspect classification. Some federal trial courts have been willing to do
so, but have later been overturned at the appellate level. 121 Courts have
been reluctant to expand the number of suspect classifications, and may
have special difficulty doing so when the classification is as intensely
debated as homosexuality. In addition, once sexual orientation is considered a suspect classification all forms of discrimination, including employment, housing, and military discrimination, will have to be eliminated
throughout our legal system. Rather than take such a drastic step, courts
may prefer to follow a lesser standard of scrutiny, or solve the problem
of custody on alternative constitutional grounds.
b.

Intermediate Scrutiny

States that deny custody to parents with same-sex partners, yet allow
parents with opposite-sex partners to obtain custody, discriminate on the
basis of gender, since parties are treated differently based on the gender
of their companions. The gender-based classification is not negated by the
fact that men and women are equally affected. Both Loving v. Virginia
(prohibiting interracial marriage)l22 and McLaughlin v. Florida (prohib-

CEL T. SAGHIR, M.D & Eu ROBINS, M.D., MALE AND FEMALE HOMOSEXUALITY
(1973) (for a summary of the literature).
119. GEORGE H. WEINBERG, SOCIETY AND THE HEALTHY HOMOSEXUAL 69-71
(1973); ALAN P. BELL, MARTIN S. WEINBERG, & SUE KIEFER HAMMERSMITH, SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN 32 (1981).
120. Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
121. Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1349.
122. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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iting interracial cohabitation)l23 held that statutes applying race-based
classifications are a form of racial discrimination. It follows that if gender-based classifications are employed, it results in gender discrimination,
which should warrant an application of intermediate level scrutiny. 124
The standard for intermediate level scrutiny, as articulated by the
Supreme Court, is that the classifications employed must be related to
achieving an important governmental interest. 125 Few would dispute that
determining the best interests of the minor child is an important governmental interest. However, decisions that neglect the best interest of the
child and instead focus upon the court's unfounded beliefs regarding the
dangers of homosexuality no longer operate to protect that important
governmental interest. It may well be in the best interests of the child to
be placed in the custody of the gay parent. Some may argue that protecting traditional family values are important governmental objectives in and
of themselves. However, objectives that further a particular moral/religious viewpoint, but at the same time restrict the rights of any minority group, should not warrant such deference. Use of a nexus standard
would keep the focus upon the best interest of the child and ensure that
only this important governmental interest was considered.
B.

PRIVACY

Bowers v. Hardwick makes it difficult to sustain a privacy argument
on behalf of the gay parent. If states are free to criminalize sodomy,
states would be able to impose restrictions on those who presumably
engage in criminal acts without violating their right to privacy. However,
Hardwick may be distinguished. First, while states may criminalize the
act of sodomy, presumably they are unable to criminalize the status of
homosexuality.l26 Since custody cases may be decided without any evidence of actual same-sex activity, those decisions adverse to the gay parent are actually based on the parent's status as gay, lesbian, or bisexual. 127 Second, while Hardwick was based upon a federal constitutional
right to privacy regarding homosexual conduct, custody cases are decided
in state courts, under state statutes and constitutions. The particular state
in which custody is being adjudicated may have an explicit or implicit
right to privacy which may extend beyond those granted by the federal
constitution. 128 The right to privacy in that state may preclude unwar123. McLaughlin, 379 U.S. 184.
124. Miller, supra note 116, at 811.
125. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
126. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1961) (invalidated California statute
criminalizing the status of being an addict).
127. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., ARIz. CONST. art. 11, § 8; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 1; FLA. CONST.
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ranted intrusion by the state into the parent's sexual activity.
Finally, the additional factors of marriage, families, and children are
present, which may be sufficient to negate Hardwick. The Court in
Hardwick failed to fmd a right to privacy for homosexual sodomy since
such a right was not related to marriage, procreation, or the family. 129
However, since a custody detennination necessarily involves all of these
factors, custody detennination cases are more similar to Griswold v. Connecticut,l30 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 131 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 132
which limit the state's ability to interfere with the fundamental rights of
the family.
While the state has a compelling interest in protecting the health and
welfare of children, this compelling interest does not justify the use of
the conclusive disqualification standard. Since there is no nexus per se
between homosexuality and harm to children, the intrusion is unwarranted
in the overwhelming majority of cases where no specific harm is articulated. Therefore, only the direct adverse impact standard, which requires
that a nexus be demonstrated, should be pennissible under current privacy
doctrine.
C.

FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION

Cases applying the rebuttable presumption approach often utilize restrictions on custody or visitation that limit the gay parent's ability to
associate with other gay and lesbian individuals. The gay parent may not
be pennitted to live with her or his lover, have the lover or other gay
individuals in the presence of the child, or attend meetings of gay organizations or churches. 133 These restrictions unduly interfere with the gay
parent's right to free association.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the right of association in the case of NAACP v. Alabama, stating that any governmental
action which has the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate "with
others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, religious,
and cultural ends" is subject to the closest judicial scrutiny}34 In addition, the Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees recognized a right of
"intimate association.,,13s This right "afford[s] the fonnation and preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial mea-

art. 1, § 23; LA. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
129. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 186.
130. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
131. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
132. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
133. See supra Part m.B.
134. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
135. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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sure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the State. "136
While in the Jaycees case the discussion involved the right of organizations to decline to admit women, a number of commentators have argued that this right should apply to relationships between parents and
their same-sex companions. 137 Some courts have recognized that this
right, coupled with the above-mentioned privacy rights, precludes the
court's intrusion into intimate matters. One California Court of Appeal
found it "intrusive upon the privacy and associational interests of the
mother" for the lower court to condition custody upon her not having any
male guests.138 While courts retain the right to investigate the associations of the parent that might possibly impact the children and impose
restrictions if necessary to promote the child's welfare, these restrictions
are often imposed with minimal investigation and with no showing that a
particular relationship is harmful. Instead the court assumes that any exposure to homosexuality is sufficient to warrant restriction. 139

VI.

CONCLUSION

Gay and lesbian child custody cases that utilize rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions rely heavily on bias. Presumptions should be rejected
in favor of a direct adverse impact, or nexus, standard, where harm
caused by parental same-sex orientation must be demonstrated before that
orientation is a factor in the custody decision. Utilizing a direct adverse
impact standard would result in a more fair result for gay and lesbian
parents. In addition, the result is more likely to comport with constitutional principles of equal protection, privacy, and freedom of association.

136. Id at 619.
137. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. 1. 624,
682-86 (1980); David A. 1. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional
Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 854 (1986).
138. In re Marriage of Wellman, 104 Cal. App. 3d 992 (1980).
139. NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 15, at 1-62.

